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Abstract
This paper introduces an innovative Bayesian machine learning algorithm to draw infer-
ence on heterogeneous causal effects in the presence of imperfect compliance (e.g., under
an irregular assignment mechanism). We show, through Monte Carlo simulations, that the
proposed Bayesian Causal Forest with Instrumental Variable (BCF-IV) algorithm outper-
forms other machine learning techniques tailored for causal inference (namely, Generalized
Random Forest and Causal Trees with Instrumental Variable) in estimating the causal
effects. Moreover, we show that it converges to an optimal asymptotic performance in dis-
covering the drivers of heterogeneity in a simulated scenario. BCF-IV sheds a light on the
heterogeneity of causal effects in instrumental variable scenarios and, in turn, provides the
policy-makers with a relevant tool for targeted policies. Its empirical application evaluates
the effects of additional funding on students’ performances. The results indicate that BCF-
IV could be used to enhance the effectiveness of school funding on students’ performance
by 3.2 to 3.5 times.
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1 Introduction
In recent years the ability of machines to solve increasingly more intricate tasks has grown ex-
ponentially. At the core of this revolution (Sejnowski, 2018), there is the staggering predictive
power of machine learning algorithms. However, prediction does not imply causation (Lechner,
2019). In social and health sciences the largest part of scientific research questions deals with
inferring a causal relationship (e.g., evaluating the impact of a policy, the effects of drug, the
returns from a marketing or business strategy and so on). Moreover, following the growing
availability of large datasets, the necessity to deal with problems connected with potentially
heterogeneous treatment effects is stronger than what was observed in the past. The availability
of large datasets makes it possible to investigate and, in turn, customize the causal effect esti-
mates for population subsets as well as for individuals (Athey, 2018). In this scenario, machine
learning techniques are increasingly used to address causal inference tasks and, in particular, to
estimate heterogeneous causal effects (Foster et al., 2011; Hill, 2011; Su et al., 2012; Green and
Kern, 2012; Athey and Imbens, 2016; Hahn et al., 2017; Wager and Athey, 2018; Lee et al., 2018;
Lechner, 2019). A growing literature seeks to apply supervised machine learning techniques to
the problem of estimating heterogeneous treatment effects. In their seminal contributions, Hill
(2011) and Foster et al. (2011) propose to directly apply machine learning algorithms to esti-
mate the unit level causal effect as a function of the units’ attributes. In other papers, machine
learning algorithms are adapted to estimate the heterogeneous causal effects (Athey and Imbens,
2016; Athey et al., 2016; Hahn et al., 2017; Wager and Athey, 2018; Lechner, 2019). However,
most of these techniques are tailored for causal inference in settings where the treatment is ran-
domly assigned to the units and do not address imperfect compliance issues. Nevertheless, in the
real world, the implementation of policies or interventions often results in imperfect compliance,
which makes the policy evaluation complicated. Imperfect compliance may arise in observational
studies where the assignment to the treatment can be different from the receipt of the treatment
(e.g., individuals are randomly assigned to a treatment, but not all the units that are assigned
to it actually receive it). Recently, some algorithms have been proposed to deal with imperfect
compliance (Athey et al., 2016; Hartford et al., 2016; Wang et al., 2018; Bargagli Stoffi and
Gnecco, 2019). However, these methods exhibit three principal limitations: (i) random forest-
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based algorithms for causal inference require large samples to converge to a good asymptotic
behaviour for the estimation of causal effects, as shown in Hahn et al. (2018b) and Wendling
et al. (2018); (ii) deep learning-based algorithms lack interpretability of the machine learning
black-box which can expose them to critiques, especially in the context of social sciences; (iii)
the algorithms proposed by Wang et al. (2018) and Bargagli Stoffi and Gnecco (2018, 2019)
are based on single learning algorithms that perform worse as compared to multiple learning
algorithms (i.e., ensemble methods)1 Moreover, in machine learning applications, inference and
uncertainty quantification are of secondary importance after predictive performance. However,
in policy decision settings it is crucial to know the credibility and variance of the counterfactual
predictions (Athey et al., 2016).
To address and accommodate these shortcomings this paper innovates the literature in both
a methodological and an empirical perspective. First, we develop a machine learning algorithm
tailored to draw causal inference in situations where the assignment mechanism is irregular,
namely the assignment depends on the observed and unobserved potential outcomes (Imbens and
Rubin, 2015). This methodology contributes to the increasing use of machine learning techniques
to draw causal inference (Athey and Imbens, 2017). In particular, we propose to modify a
machine learning technique, namely, Bayesian Causal Forests, developed for causal inference
goals (Hahn et al., 2017) to fit an instrumental variable setting (Angrist et al., 1996). The
proposed method, Bayesian Instrumental Variable Causal Forest (BCF-IV), is an ensemble semi-
parametric Bayesian regression model that directly builds on the Bayesian Additive Regression
Trees (BART) algorithm (Chipman et al., 2010). BART is an ensemble-of-trees approach to
nonparametric regression (Starling et al., 2018), which is in turn a refined version of the random
forest algorithm (Breiman, 2001): BART obtains more precise estimates both in non-causal
inference scenarios (Chipman et al., 2010; Murray, 2017; Linero and Yang, 2018; Linero, 2018;
Herna´ndez et al., 2018; Starling et al., 2018) and in causal inference settings (Hill, 2011; Hahn
et al., 2017, 2018b; Logan et al., 2019) by employing a full set of prior distributions on depth of
the trees, on the noise and on outcome in their nodes.
Second, we evaluate the fit of the proposed algorithm by comparing it with two alterna-
1Ensemble methods have extensively been shown to outperform single learning algorithms in prediction tasks
(Van der Laan et al., 2007).
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tive machine learning methods explicitly developed to draw causal inference in the presence of
irregular assignment mechanisms: namely, the Generalized Random Forests (GRF) algorithm
(Athey et al., 2016) and the Honest Causal Trees with Instrumental Variables (HCT-IV) al-
gorithm (Bargagli Stoffi and Gnecco, 2019). Using Monte Carlo simulations, we evaluate each
algorithm with respect to three dimensions: (i) the choice of the correct source of heterogeneity
(i.e., the choice of the right splitting variable); (ii) the choice of the correct cutoff, in the case
of a continuous splitting variable, and (iii) the estimation of the heterogeneous causal effects.
These dimensions are consistent with recent evaluations of various machine learning methods for
causal inference that highlight the excellence of Bayesian algorithms for causal inference (Hahn
et al., 2018b; Wendling et al., 2018). We show that for each dimension, BCF-IV outperforms
both GRF and HCT-IV in small samples and converges to an optimal asymptotic behaviour.
Third, we show how the proposed algorithm can be used for targeted policies, which are
increasingly relevant as the call for personalized interventions has unfurled in all social sciences,
especially in economics and management sciences (Athey and Imbens, 2017). The main objective
of targeted policies studies is to inform policy-makers about the best allocation of treatments
to individuals or sub-populations (Kitagawa and Tetenov, 2018). The idea behind these policies
is to target those observations that benefit the most from a certain intervention in order to get
either of two possible welfare gains: (i) reducing the costs of an intervention with constant effect
sizes, or (ii) increasing the intervention effects for given costs (Kleinberg et al., 2017).
Fourth, in an empirical application, BCF-IV is used for the evaluation of an educational
policy. The evaluation of educational policies is a promising field for the discovery of hetero-
geneous causal effects and, in turn, targeted policies. This is due to at least two factors: (i)
in the education context, there is a clear source of heterogeneity given by the disparate profiles
of schools and students; and (ii) it is possible to gather large (administrative) datasets. In a
similar framework, machine learning provides a tailored, data-driven tool for the evaluation of
the heterogeneity in the causal effects, and, consequently, the implementation of targeted poli-
cies. In particular, we evaluate the effects of additional resources for disadvantaged students on
students’ performance in a fuzzy Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) scenario (Hahn et al.,
2001). The fuzzy RDD that we implement in this paper is described in detail in Section 4.
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By using a unique administrative dataset, we employ BCF-IV to evaluate the heterogeneity in
the effects of the ‘Equal Educational Opportunities Program’ promoted by the Flemish Min-
istry of Education starting from 2002. The program is aimed at providing additional funding
for secondary schools with high share of disadvantaged students (De Witte et al., 2018). We
focus on the effects of additional funding on two outcomes: (i) students’ performance, namely
if a student gets the most favorable outcome (A-certificate); and (ii) students’ progresses to the
following year without retention in their grades. The Flemish Ministry of Education provided
us with data on the universe of pupils in the first stage of secondary education in the school
year 2010/2011 with a total of 135,682 students. We obtained data on student level and school
level characteristics. Moreover, this setting provides us with a quasi-experimental identification
strategy since the additional funding is provided to schools based on being above or below an
exogenously set threshold regarding the proportion of disadvantaged students. There is also a
second, exogenously set, eligibility criterion stating that schools have to generate a minimum
number of teaching hours. This provides us with an imperfect compliance setting, as not all the
schools fulfill both the criteria, in which we are able to exploit a fuzzy regression discontinuity
design to draw causal effects.
The results of our empirical application suggest that, although the effects of additional fund-
ing on the overall population of students are found to be not statistically significant2, there is
appreciable heterogeneity in the causal effects: the effects on students’ performance are positive
and significant if we focus on the sub-population of students in schools with younger teachers
(namely, teachers younger than 40 years old) and less senior principals (namely, principals with
less than 26 years of experience)3. These results can advise policy-makers in multiple ways: the
heterogeneous drivers could, on the one hand, help them enhancing the policy effectiveness by
targeting just the schools with the highest shares of pupils that benefit the most from additional
funding. On the other hand, policy-makers could investigate more in depth the reason why some
schools do not benefit from the policy and ultimately provide additional tools to these schools
to enhance the policy outcomes.
The methodology proposed in this paper can be more widely applied to evaluations of the
2This is in line with further research of additional funding on school level outcomes (De Witte et al., 2018).
3As we show in Section 4.3, these results are in line with the literature of aging on teachers’ performance.
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heterogeneous impact of an intervention in the presence of an irregular assignment mechanism
in social and biomedical sciences4.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we provide a general
overview on causal inference and the applied machine learning frameworks and we introduce our
algorithm. In Section 3 we compare the performance of our algorithm with the performance
of other methods already established in the literature. In Section 4 we depict the usage of our
algorithm in an educational scenario to evaluate the heterogeneous causal effects of additional
funding to schools. Section 5 discusses the results and highlights the further applications of
heterogeneous causal effects discovery and targeted policies in education as well as in social and
biomedical sciences.
2 Bayesian Instrumental Variable Causal Forest
2.1 Notation
This paper contributes to the literature by establishing a novel machine learning approach for
the estimation of conditional causal effects in the presence of an irregular assignment mechanism.
We follow the standard notation of the Rubin’s causal model (Rubin, 1974, 1978; Imbens
and Rubin, 2015). Given a set of N units, indexed by i = 1, ..., N , we denote with Yi a generic
outcome variable, with Wi a binary treatment indicator and, with X a N × P matrix of P
control variables. Given the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), that excludes
interference between the treatment assigned to one unit and the potential outcomes of another
(Imbens and Rubin, 2015), we can postulate the existence of a pair of potential outcomes: Yi(Wi).
Specifically, the potential outcome for a unit i if assigned to the treatment is Yi(Wi = 1) = Yi(1),
and the potential outcome if assigned to the control is Yi(Wi = 0) = Yi(0). We cannot observe for
the same unit both the potential outcomes at the same time. However, we observe the potential
outcome that corresponds to the assigned treatment: Y obsi = Yi(1)Wi + Yi(0)(1−Wi).
In order to draw proper causal inference in observational studies researchers need to assume
4An R function for BCF-IV is available upon request to the corresponding author.
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strong ignorability to hold. This assumption states that:
Yi(Wi) ⊥ Wi|Xi, (1)
and
0 < Pr(Wi = 1|Xi = x) < 1 ∀ x ∈ X, (2)
where X is the features space. The first assumption (unconfoundedness) rules out the presence
of unmeasured confounders while the second condition needs to be invoked to be able to estimate
the unbiased treatment effect on all the support of the covariates space. If these two conditions
hold, we are in the presence of the so-called regular assignment mechanism. In such a scenario
the Average Treatment Effect (ATE) can be expressed as:
τ = E[Y obsi |Wi = 1]− E[Y obsi |Wi = 0], (3)
and one can define, following Athey and Imbens (2016), the Conditional Average Treatment
Effect (CATE) simply as:
τ(x) = E[Y obsi |Wi = 1, Xi = x]− E[Y obsi |Wi = 0, Xi = x]. (4)
CATE is central for targeted policies as it enables the researcher to investigate the heterogeneity
in causal effects. For instance, we may be interested in assessing how the effects of an intervention
vary within different sub-populations.
In observational studies, the assignment to the treatment may be different from the recep-
tion of the treatment. In these scenarios, where one allows for non-compliance between the
treatment assigned and the treatment received, one can assume that the assignment is uncon-
founded, wherein the receipt is confounded (Angrist et al., 1996). In such cases, one can rely
on an instrumental variable (IV), Zi, to draw proper causal inference
5. Zi can be thought as
5Throughout this Section and throughout the paper we assume the instrumental variable to be binary but,
one could, in principle, relax this assumption. However, at the moment there are only a few studies that develop
machine learning algorithms for the estimation of heterogeneous causal effects with continuous treatment variable:
we leave the application of such algorithms to further research.
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a randomized assignment to the treatment, that affects the receipt of the treatment Wi, with-
out directly affecting the outcome Yi (exclusion restriction). Thus, one can then express the
treatment received as a function of the treatment assigned: Wi(Zi).
If the classical four IV assumptions6 (Angrist et al., 1996) hold, one can get the causal effect
of the treatment on the sub-population of compliers, the so-called Complier Average Causal
Effect (CACE), that is:
τ cace = ITTY,C =
E[Yi|Zi = 1]− E[Yi|Zi = 0]
E[Wi|Zi = 1]− E[Wi|Zi = 0] =
ITTY
piC
. (5)
CACE is also sometimes referred as LATE (Local Average Treatment Effects) and represents
the estimate of causal effect of the assignment to treatment on the principal outcome, Yi, for the
subpopulation of compliers (Imbens and Rubin, 2015). In this paper we consider the following
conditional version of CATE. The conditional CACE, τ cace(x), can be thought as the CACE for
a sub-population of observations defined by a vector of characteristics x:
τ cace(x) = ITTY,C(x) =
E[Yi|Zi = 1, Xi = x]− E[Yi|Zi = 0, Xi = x]
E[Wi|Zi = 1, Xi = x]− E[Wi|Zi = 0, Xi = x] =
ITTY (x)
piC(x)
. (6)
2.2 Estimating Conditional Causal Effects with Machine Learning
In recent years, various algorithms have been proposed to estimate conditional causal effects
(i.e, CATE and τ cace(x)). Most algorithms focus on the estimation of CATE (Hill, 2011; Su
et al., 2012; Green and Kern, 2012; Athey and Imbens, 2016; Hahn et al., 2017; Wager and
Athey, 2018; Lee et al., 2018; Lechner, 2019) while just a few (Athey et al., 2016; Hartford et al.,
2016; Wang et al., 2018; Bargagli Stoffi and Gnecco, 2019) focus on the estimation of τ cace(x).
In this paper, we propose an algorithm for the estimation of CATE in an irregular assignment
mechanism scenario. In particular, we adapt the Bayesian Causal Forest (BCF) algorithm (Hahn
et al., 2017) for such a task. BCF was originally proposed for regular assignment mechanisms.
This algorithm builds on the Bayesian Additive Regression Trees (BART) algorithm (Chipman
et al., 2010) which in turn is a Bayesian version of an ensemble of Classification and Regression
Trees (CART) (Breiman et al., 1984)7.
6See Appendix A for a detailed discussion of the four assumptions and how they are assumed to hold in our
application reported in Section 4.
7Chipman et al. (2010) highlight how their algorithm is different from other ensemble methods such as the
Random Forest algorithm (Breiman, 2001).
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CART is a widely used algorithm for the construction of binary trees (namely, trees where
each node is splitted into only two branches). A binary tree is constructed by splitting a node
into two child nodes repeatedly, beginning with the root node that contains the whole learning
sample and proceeding with the splits to the final nodes (leaves). Figure 1 illustrates how the
binary partitioning works in practice in a simple case with just two regressors x1 ∈ [0, 1] and
x2 ∈ [0, 1].
Figure 1: (Left) An example binary tree. The internal nodes are labelled by their splitting rules and the
terminal nodes labelled with the corresponding parameters li.
(Right) The corresponding partition of the sample space.
Binary trees are named classification trees when the outcome variable can take a discrete
set of values, and regression trees when the outcome variable takes continuous values. The
CART algorithm associates, for every individual belonging to a partition of the feature space,
a conditional prediction for the outcome variable. The task of a binary tree is to estimate the
conditional expectation of the observed outcome, on the basis of the information on features
and outcomes for units in the training sample, and to compare the resulting estimates on a test
sample to tune the complexity of the tree, in order to minimize the “error”8 between the true
and estimated values of Yi(x) within each partition.
The accuracy of the predictions of binary trees, Yˆi(x), can be dramatically improved by
iteratively constructing the trees. A Random Forest (RF) consists in an ensemble of trees,
where each tree is constructed by randomly sampling the observations and randomly drawing
the covariates (predictors, in the machine learning literature) that are used to build each tree
8There are various “error” measures used to optimize binary trees. The most widely used are the mean-
squared-error for regression trees and the entropy or the Gini index for classification trees.
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(Breiman, 2001). One of the main problems of RFs is that they tend to “overfit” the data on
which they are trained. “Overfitting” leads to a scarce generalizability of the predictions on
samples different from the training set. In order to avoid this, Bayesian Additive Regression
Trees were proposed by Chipman et al. (2010).
BART, as well as BCF, are “refined versions” of the RF algorithm. BART is, as the RF, a
sum-of-trees ensemble algorithm, but its estimation approach used to obtain the values of Yi(x)
relies on a fully Bayesian probability model (Kapelner and Bleich, 2013). In particular, the
BART model can be expressed as:
Yi = f(Xi) + i ≈ T1(Xi) + ...+ Tq(Xi) + i, i ∼ N (0, σ2), (7)
where the q distinct binary trees are denoted by T9.
The Bayesian component of the algorithm is incorporated in a set of three different priors on:
(i) the structure of the trees (this prior is aimed at limiting the complexity of any single tree T and
works as a regularization device); (ii) the probability distribution of data in the nodes (this prior
is aimed at shrinking the node predictions towards the center of the distribution of the response
variable Yi); (iii) the error variance σ
2 (which bounds away σ2 from very small values that would
lead the algorithm to overfit the training data)10. The aim of these priors is to “regularize” the
algorithm, preventing single trees to dominate the overall fit of the model (Kapelner and Bleich,
2013). Moreover, BART allows the researcher to tune the variables’ importance by departing
from the original formulation of the Random Forest algorithm where each variable is equally
likely to be chosen from a discrete uniform distribution (with probability 1
p
) to build a single
tree learner. These Bayesian tools give researchers the possibility to mitigate the “overfitting”
problem of RFs and to tune the algorithm with prior knowledge. Give these characteristics
BART has shown particular flexibility and an excellent performance in both prediction tasks
9T represents the entire tree: its structure, its nodes and its leaves (terminal nodes).
10The choice of the priors, and the derivation of the posterior distributions, is discussed in depth by Chipman
et al. (2010) and Kapelner and Bleich (2013). Namely, (i) the prior on the probability that a node will split at
depth k is β(1 + k)−η where β ∈ (0, 1), η ∈ [0,∞) (these hyper-parameters are generally chosen to be η = 2 and
β = 0.95); (ii) the prior on the probability distribution in the nodes is a normal distribution with zero mean:
N (0, σ2q ) where σq = σ0/
√
q and σ0 can be used to calibrate the plausible range of the regression function; (iii)
the prior on the error variance is σ2 ∼ InvGamma(v/2, vλ/2) where λ is determined from the data in a way that
the BART will improve 90% of the times the RMSE of an OLS model.
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(Murray, 2017; Linero and Yang, 2018; Linero, 2018; Herna´ndez et al., 2018; Starling et al.,
2018) and in causal inference tasks (Hill, 2011; Hahn et al., 2017; Logan et al., 2019).
Thus far, the algorithms that we discussed were tailored to find heterogeneity in the response
variable Yi(x), but are not developed to estimate the heterogeneity in the causal effects. The
BCF algorithm proposed by Hahn et al. (2017) is a semi-parametric Bayesian regression model
that directly builds on BART. It however introduces some significant changes in order to estimate
heterogeneous treatment effects in regular assignment mechanisms (even in the presence of strong
confounding). The principal novelties of this model are the expression of the conditional mean
of the response variable as a sum of two functions and the introduction, in the BART model
specification for causal inference, of an estimate of the propensity score, E[Wi = 1|Xi = x] =
pi(x), in order to improve the estimation of heterogeneous treatment effects11. As depicted from
the results of the Atlantic Causal Inference Conference (ACIC) competition in 2016 and 2017,
reported by Hahn et al. (2018b), it was observed that BCF performs dramatically better than
other machine learning algorithms for causal inference in the presence of randomized and regular
assignment mechanisms.
2.3 Extending BCF to an IV Scenario: Bayesian Instrumental Vari-
able Causal Forest
Bargagli Stoffi and Gnecco (2019) show that a na¨ıve application of methods developed for the es-
timation of heterogeneous causal effects in randomized or regular assignment mechanisms would
introduce a large bias in the estimation of the heterogeneous causal effects in imperfect compli-
ance settings. Moreover, the authors show that this would lead to very imprecise heterogeneous
causal effects estimators. This reason drives the need for a new algorithm, the Bayesian Instru-
mental Variable Causal Forest (BCF-IV), tailored for causal inference on heterogeneous effects
in the presence of irregular mechanisms.
11It is important to highlight that the propensity score is not used to estimate the causal effects but to
moderate the distortive effects in treatment heterogeneity discovery due to strong confounding. Moreover, since
BCF includes the entire predictors’ vector, X, even if the propensity score is mis-specified or poorly estimated,
the model allows for the possibility that the response remains correctly specified (Hahn et al., 2017). In Appendix
B, we show that even if the estimate pˆi(x) of the propensity score is incorrectly specified the results are still widely
robust.
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The BCF-IV algorithm is constructed in two steps:
1. Discovering heterogeneity for the conditional intention-to-treat (ITTY (x));
2. Estimation of the conditional CACE (τ cace(x)) within the sub-populations defined in the
first step.
We will discuss these two steps in detail in the next Section.
2.3.1 Heterogeneity in the Conditional ITT
The BCF-IV algorithm starts from modifying (7) to adapt it for the estimation of the intention-
to-treat, by including the instrumental variable Zi:
Yi = f(Xi, Zi) + i ≈ T1(Xi, Zi) + ...+ Tq(Xi, Zi) + i, i ∼ N (0, σ2), (8)
where, for simplicity, we assume the error to be a mean zero additive noise as in Hill (2011);
Hahn et al. (2017); Logan et al. (2019). The conditional expected value can be expressed as:
E[Yi|Zi = z,Xi = x] = µ(z, x), (9)
and in turn the conditional intention-to-treat, ITTY (x), is:
ITTY (x) = E[Yi|Zi = 1, Xi = x]− E[Yi|Zi = 0, Xi = x] = µ(1, x)− µ(0, x). (10)
Then, adapting to an irregular assignment mechanism the model proposed by Hahn et al. (2017),
we adopt the following functional form for (9):
E[Yi|Zi = z,Xi = x] = µ(x, pˆi(x)) + ITTY (x)z (11)
where pˆi(x) is the estimated propensity score for the instrumental variable:
pi(x) = E[Zi = 1|Xi = x]. (12)
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The expression of E[Yi|Zi = z,Xi = x] as a sum of two functions is central: the first component of
the sum, µ(x, pˆi(x)), directly models the impact of the control variables on the conditional mean
of the response (the component that is independent from the treatment effects) while the second
component ITTY (x)z models directly the intention-to-treat effect as a nonlinear function of the
observed characteristics (this second components captures the heterogeneity in the intention-to-
treat). Both the functions µ and ITTY are given independent priors. These priors are chosen
in line with Hahn et al. (2017) to be for the first component the same priors of Chipman et al.
(2010) (see Section 2.2). However, for the second component the priors are changed in a way
that allows for less deep, hence simpler trees12.
The expression of E[Yi|Zi = z,Xi = x] as a sum of two functions has a double effect: (i)
on the one hand, it allows the algorithm to learn which component in the heterogeneity of the
conditional mean of the outcome is driven by a direct effect of the control variables and which
component is the true heterogeneity in the effects of the assignment to the treatment Zi on Yi;
(ii) on the other hand, it allows the predictions of the treatment effect driven by the BART to
be modelled directly and separately with respect to the impact of the control variables (Hahn
et al., 2017).
The estimated propensity score, in the BCF model, is not used for the estimation of the effects
but is included, as an additional covariate, in the first component of (11) to mitigate possible
problems connected to regularization induced confounding (RIC)13 and targeted selection14. In
our application in Section 4, none of these problems are present since the specification of the
propensity score for Zi is known by the researcher (namely, pˆi(x) = pi(x)). However, in scenarios
where the instrumental variable is not randomized ex-ante, the inclusion of pˆi(x) leads to an
improvement in the discovery of the heterogeneity in the causal effect (Hahn et al., 2018b).
Furthermore, it is important to highlight that choosing a mis-specified definition of pˆi(x) does
not impact in a significant way the quality of the results as shown in Appendix B. This is due
12The depth penalty parameters are set to be η = 3 and β = 0.25 (instead of η = 2 and β = 0.95).
13RIC is analyzed in depth in Hahn et al. (2018a). RIC issues rise when the ML algorithm used for regularizing
the coefficient does not shrink to zero some coefficients due to a nonzero correlation between Zi and Xi resulting
in an additional degree of bias that is not under the researcher’s control.
14Targeted selection refers to settings where the treatment (or in an IV scenario the assignment to the treat-
ment) is assigned based on an ex-ante prediction of the outcome conditional on some characteristics Xi. We refer
to Hahn et al. (2017) for a discussion of targeted selection problems.
12
to the fact that this first step of our algorithm is not about directly estimating the conditional
CACE but is tailored to discover the heterogeneity in ITTY (x).
Once one estimated with the BCF-IV the unit-level intention-to-treat, one can build a simple
binary tree, using a CART model Breiman (1984), on the fitted values (ITT
∧
Y (Xi)) to discover
the drivers of the heterogeneity.
2.3.2 Estimation of Conditional CACE
Once the heterogeneous patterns in the intention-to-treat are learned from the algorithm, one can
estimate the conditional CACE, τ cace(x). To do so, one can simply use the method of moments
estimator in (6) within all the different sub-populations that were detected in the previous step.
The conditional CACE can be estimated in a generic sub-sample (i.e., for each Xi ∈ Xj, where
Xj is a generic node of the tree, like a non-terminal node or a leaf) as:
τˆ cace(Xi) =
ITT
∧
Y (Xi)
pˆiC(Xi)
, (13)
where pˆiC(Xi) is estimated as:
pˆiC(Xi) =
1
N1,l
∑
l:Xl∈Xj
Wl · Zl − 1
N0,l
∑
l:Xl∈Xj
Wl · (1− Zl), (14)
and ITT
∧
Y (Xi) as:
ITT
∧
Y (Xi) =
1
N1,l
∑
l:Xl∈Xj
Y obsl · Zl −
1
N0,l
∑
l:Xl∈Xj
Y obsl · (1− Zl), (15)
where Nk,l (where k ∈ {0, 1}) is the number of observations with Zl ∈ {0, 1} in the sub-sample
of observations with Xl ∈ Xj15.
To show in detail how this second step works let us use a toy example. Let’s imagine a simple
heterogeneity structure for ITTY (x) where ITTY (Xi,p > 0)ITTY (Xi,p ≤ 0) and Xi,p ∈ (−1, 1)
15It is worth highlighting that, since the supervised machine learning technique is used just in the discovery
phase and not in the estimation phase, the estimators that are proposed here could be used in a more “traditional
way”, in settings where the subgroups are defined ex-ante by the researcher (e.g. grade retention, teacher seniority
and principal seniority).
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is a single regressor. This is namely, the case where the average intention-to-treat for those
individuals with positive values of Xi,p is greater than for individuals with non-positive values.
Then, the conditional CACE can be estimated in the two different sub-populations defined with
respect to Xp as
16:
τˆ cace(Xi,p > 0) =
ITT
∧
Y (Xi,p > 0)
pˆiC(Xi,p > 0)
and τˆ cace(Xi,p ≤ 0) = ITT
∧
Y (Xi,p ≤ 0)
pˆiC(Xi,p ≤ 0) . (16)
2.4 Properties of the Conditional CACE Estimator
In the case of a binary instrument (Zi ∈ {0, 1}) and a binary treatment variable (Wi ∈ {0, 1}),
Angrist et al. (1996) and Imbens and Rubin (2015) revealed that the population versions of
(13)-(15) correspond to a Two Stage Least Squares (henceforth referred as TSLS) estimator of
τ cace, in the cases where the four IV assumptions can be assumed to hold. Hence, since this case
is analogous to our setting, one can apply the TSLS method in every node Xj of the tree T for
the estimation of the effect on the compliers population, as it is presented by Imbens and Rubin
(1997).
The two simultaneous equations of the TSLS estimator are, in the population,
Y obsi = α + τ
cace ·Wi + i, (17)
Wi = pi0 + piC · Zi + ηi, (18)
where E(i) = E(ηi) = 0, and E(Ziηi) = 017. In the econometric terminology, the explanatory
variable Wi is endogenous, while the IV variable Zi is exogenous.
We can express the TSLS equations, conditional on a subpopulation of a node Xj, as
Y obsi,Xj = αXj + τ
cace
Xj ·Wi,Xj + i,Xj , (19)
Wi,Xj = pi0,Xj + piC,Xj · Zi,Xj + ηi,Xj , (20)
16Alternatively, one can perform a Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) regression within the different sub-
populations. This is our preferred estimation strategy and is the one used both for the simulations and the real
application.
17The latter comes from the fact that (18) is assumed to represent the linear projection of Wi onto Zi.
14
where E(i,Xj) = E(ηi,Xj) = 0, and E(Zi,Xjηi,Xj) = 0.
Moreover, the following reduced equation (obtained plugging (20) into (19)) holds:
Y obsi,Xj =
(
αXj + τ
cace
Xj · pi0,Xj
)
+
(
τ caceXj · piC,Xj
)
· Zi,Xj +
(
i,Xj + τ
cace
Xj · ηi,Xj
)
= α¯Xj + γXj · Zi,Xj + ψi,Xj . (21)
In the case of a single instrument, the logic of IV regression is that one can estimate the respective
parameters piC,Xj and γXj = τ
cace
Xj · piC,Xj of the regressions (20) and (21) above by least squares,
when the observations in each node are independent and identically distributed, then obtaining
an estimate of the parameter τ caceXj in (19). In particular, for every element Xi of a node Xj,
one can estimate τCACE(Xi) = τ
cace
Xj through TSLS, as the following ratio (Imbens and Rubin,
2015):
τˆCACE(Xi) ≡ τˆTSLSXj =
γˆXj
pˆiC,Xj
. (22)
The TSLS estimator associated with (19)-(21) satisfies the next properties. They can be
proved likewise in the application of TSLS to the population case (see, e.g., Imbens and Rubin
(2015)).
Theorem 1: Consistency of the Conditional TSLS Estimator.
Let E(Z2i,Xj) 6= 0 (Assumption 1), E(Zi,Xji,Xj) = 0 (Assumption 2) and piC,Xj 6= 0 (Assumption
3) hold. Then
τˆTSLSXj − τXj
p→ 0 as NXj →∞, (23)
where
p→ denotes convergence in probability, and NXj is the number of observations within the
node Xj.
Theorem 2: Asymptotic Normality of the Conditional TSLS Estimator.
Let Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Let also E(Z2i,Xj
2
i,Xj) be finite (Assumption 4). Then
√
NXj
(
τˆTSLSXj − τXj
) d→ N (0, NXj · avar(τˆTSLSXj )) as NXj →∞, (24)
where
d→ denotes convergence in distribution, N stands for normal distribution, and avar(τˆTSLSXj )
is the asymptotic variance of the TSLS estimator.
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The proofs of the two Theorems above directly follow from their unconditional versions18.
In this case, we want to stress that in order for the convergence of our estimator to τXj and
its normality to hold approximately we need to have a sufficient number of observations within
every node. Hence, we suggest to perform our algorithm on sufficiently large datasets and to
trim those nodes where the number of observations is not large enough.
3 Monte Carlo Simulations
To evaluate the performance of the BCF-IV algorithm we compare it, using Monte Carlo Sim-
ulations, with two methods that are directly tailored for drawing causal inference in irregular
assignment mechanism scenarios: the Honest Causal Trees with Instrumental Variable (HCT-
IV) algorithm (Bargagli Stoffi and Gnecco, 2019) and the Generalized Random Forests (GRF)
algorithm (Athey et al., 2016). Both the latter algorithms outperform other machine learn-
ing algorithms which are not tailored for irregular assignment mechanisms (Bargagli Stoffi and
Gnecco, 2019), so we focus, in this context, just on a comparison within these three algorithms.
Since the foremost focus of this paper is on discovery of the heterogeneity in the causal effects,
we compare the algorithms on three dimensions: (i) the correct choice of the variable that drives
the heterogeneity (heterogeneity driving variable [HDV]), (ii) the correct choice of the threshold
value used to perform the binary split of the data given the right identification of HDV, and (iii)
the mean-squared error for the heterogeneous causal effects given the correct choice of HDV.
For Monte Carlo Simulations we build two different designs. The functional forms of the
designs are built following the simulation designs in Wang et al. (2018). The first design takes the
form of Yi =
∑k
p=1Xi,p+Wi ·Xi,1 +ξi+i where Xi,p ∼ N (0, 1), Wi ∼ Bern(0.5), ξi ∼ N (0, 0.01)
and i ∼ N (0, 1). The interaction term between the regressor Xi,1 and the treatment indicator
Wi is functional to heterogenise the treatment effects, while the nuisance parameter ξi is an
unobserved variable that affects both Wi and the response variable Yi. The second design has
the same functional form but xi,p ∼ Bern(0.5). In both the designs we set the correlations
between Wi, the instrument Zi and the nuisance parameter ξi to be: Cor(Wi, Zi) ∈ (0.55, 0.65)
and Cor(Wi, ξi) ∈ (0.45, 0.55), while k assumes values 5 and 10 and the sample sizes are 500,
18For further details on these proofs we refer to (Wooldridge, 2002, Section 5.2).
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1,000, 5,000. For both designs the results are aggregated over 30 rounds of simulations.
The results from the simulations are shown in Table 1. As shown in Panel A, the correct
identification of the HDV is very similar for BCF-IV and GRF in the designs with 500 and 5,000
units. GRF is asymptotically faster in identifying the right HDV, as it outperforms both BCF-IV
and HCT-IV when the sample size is 1,000. Panel B depicts the results in terms of mean squared
error between the true and the predicted threshold used to perform the binary split of the data.
The threshold is not available in Design 2 where the regressors are binary variables. BCF-IV
outperforms both GRF and HCT-IV with all the sample sizes and with both 5 and 10 features
(with the exception of Design 1 in the sample of 5,000 units with 5 features). Panel C depicts the
mean squared error of prediction for the causal effects given the correct identification of the HDV.
Another clear advantage of using BCF-IV is given by the correct identification of the treatment
effects. Indeed, BCF-IV outperforms, in terms of lower mean-squared-error of prediction for
the treatment effects, the other algorithms in both the designs with 5 and 10 features (with
the exception of Design 1 in the samples of 5,000 units with 5 features and 500 units with 10
features). Hence, in a scenario with binary regressors, BCF-IV is preferable irrespective of the
sample size. However, in a scenario with continuous regressors19, there is a tradeoff between the
capacity of getting the right HDV and the capacity of correctly estimating the causal effect. In
designs with samples sizes of 1,000, GRF outperforms BCF-IV in correctly identifying the HDV
but fails to precisely estimate the causal effect. As the sample size increases, particularly in
the scenario with 5 features, both the algorithms get to the same asymptotic results in terms of
correct HDV identification and the mean-squared-error of prediction.
We argue that, in small samples, BCF-IV would be preferable to GRF because, while the
proportion of correctly identified HDVs is very similar, the gains obtained both in terms of mean-
squared-error between the true and predicted threshold and the true and predicted causal effects
are much larger. In fact, the relative gap20 between the true and predicted causal effects ranges
between 15% and 81% in favour of BCF-IV, while the relative gap in the proportion of correctly
19For instance, when the regressors are distributed according to a standardized normal distribution.
20The formula for the relative gap is, for the MSE of prediction, the following (Wang et al., 2018):
Relative Gap =
MSEGRF −MSEBCF -IV
MSEGRF
× 100.
The relative gap is positive when BCF-IV outperforms GRF and negative viceversa.
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identified HDV ranges from -10% (in favour of GRF) to 30% (in favour of BCF-IV). Moreover,
Figure 2 depicts the distribution of the estimated causal effects over 100 repeated bootstrapped
samples for both BCF-IV and GRF. In both cases the distribution of the estimated effect for
BCF-IV is centered closer to the true values (one and two, respectively) than its distribution for
GRF. Hence, we claim that the gain in the mean-squared-error of prediction for the causal effect
outweighs the slower identification of HDVs. This holds true as BCF-IV and GRF converge to
a very similar fit, as the sample size increases, with respect to the three dimensions that are
object of our analysis. Moreover, the asymptotic behaviour of BCF-IV is slightly better than
the one of all the other techniques.
Table 1: Monte Carlo Comparison of BCF-IV, GRF and HCT-IV21
Panel A: Proportion of Correctly Identified Heterogeneity Driving Variables (HDV)
Sample Size
#Features Approach 500 1,000 5,000 500 1,000 5,000
Design 1 Design 2
HDV
5 BCF-IV 0.57 0.57 1.00 0.90 0.96 1.00
GRF 0.63 0.83 1.00 0.93 1.00 1.00
HCT-IV 0.43 0.40 0.70 0.53 0.56 0.86
10 BCF-IV 0.30 0.33 0.73 0.53 0.93 1.00
GRF 0.23 0.43 1.00 0.50 0.96 1.00
HCT-IV 0.17 0.30 0.77 0.20 0.63 0.83
21Note: In this Table we show the results from Monte Carlo simulations. Panel A depicts the proportion
of correctly identified heterogeneity driving variables (HDVs). Panel B shows the mean squared error between
true and predicted threshold (which is available just for the model with normally distributed variables). Panel
C depicts the mean squared error between true and predicted causal effects. We highlighted in bold the best
results for every round of simulations. In case of the same mean-squared-error of prediction (that occurs with
BCF-IV and HCT-IV since both techniques are based on the same estimator) we assigned the best performance
to the technique that performs better in identifying the correct HDVs. The results are obtained by aggregating
30 bootstrap samples.
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Panel B: Mean Squared Error between True and Predicted Threshold
Sample Size
#Features Approach 500 1,000 5,000 500 1,000 5,000
Design 1 Design 2
Threshold
5 BCF-IV 0.062 0.037 0.006 - - -
GRF 0.063 0.069 0.002 - - -
HCT-IV 0.185 0.188 0.045 - - -
10 BCF-IV 0.046 0.014 0.017 - - -
GRF 0.190 0.125 0.040 - - -
HCT-IV 0.096 0.023 0.167 - - -
Panel C: Mean Squared Error between True and Predicted Causal Effects
Sample Size
#Features Approach 500 1,000 5,000 500 1,000 5,000
Design 1 Design 2
Causal Effects
5 BCF-IV 0.047 0.026 0.002 0.048 0.005 0.010
GRF 0.330 0.030 0.001 0.055 0.006 0.011
HCT-IV 0.067 0.051 0.012 0.048 0.005 0.010
10 BCF-IV 0.017 0.021 0.020 0.036 0.005 0.002
GRF 0.230 0.197 0.128 0.190 0.105 0.012
HCT-IV 0.013 0.039 0.046 0.036 0.005 0.002
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(a) The true heterogeneous effect is one (b) The true heterogeneous effect is two.
Figure 2: Distribution of the estimated causal effects for both BCF-IV and GRF in 100 bootstrapped samples
in the first design.
In Appendix B, we provide a number of robustness checks of the Monte Carlo simulation. In
particular, we focus on what happens to the fit of the three algorithms when one: (i) changes the
correlation between Zi and Wi (possible weak-instrument problems)
22; (ii) introduces a violation
in the exclusion restriction; (iii) changes the specification of the propensity score for the BCF-IV;
(iv) introduces multiple heterogeneity variables; (v) changes the error distribution. The results
that we highlighted before hold true also in the robustness checks: BCF-IV converges slowly to
an optimal identification of the HDVs but largely outperforms GRF with respect to the mean-
squared-error of prediction for the causal effects23. Moreover, the performance of BCF-IV does
not seem to widely deteriorate, as compared to the baseline models in Table 1, in any of the
robustness designs.
4 Heterogeneous Causal Effects of Education Funding
There is a wide consensus that education positively influences labor market outcomes (see the
review by Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2018)). Students’ performance can be driven by multiple
factors connected with students’ characteristics and environmental characteristics. However, to
22It is important to highlight that in order to avoid weak-instrument problems within a node our algorithm
performs a weak-instrument test in every sub-sample (namely, an F-test on the first stage regression) and discards
the nodes where the null hypothesis of weak instrument is not rejected.
23However, when we introduce a partial violation of the exclusion restriction assumption (design 2) we see
exactly the opposite: BCF-IV outperforms GRF with respect to the identification of the correct HDV while GRF
outperforms BCF-IV in precisely estimating the causal effects.
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the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to study the impact of additional school funding
on students’ performance using machine learning techniques tailored for causal inference. In this
Section we apply the BCF-IV algorithm to evaluate the impact and estimate the heterogeneity in
the effects of additional funding to schools with disadvantaged students on students’ performance.
First, we describe the data used for this application. Next, we depict the identification strategy.
Finally, we describe the results obtained and their relevance in the economics of education
literature.
4.1 Data
Starting from the year 2002, the Flemish Ministry of Education promoted the “Equal Educational
Opportunities” program (henceforth referred as EEO) to ensure equal educational opportunities
to all the students (OECD, 2017). The EEO program provides additional funding for secondary
schools with a significant share of disadvantaged students. Owing to the funding schools can
hire additional teachers and increase the number of teaching hours. Pupils are considered to be
disadvantaged on the basis of five different indicators: (i) the pupil lives outside the family; (ii)
the pupil does not speak Dutch as a native language; (iii) the mother of the pupil does not have a
secondary education degree; (iv) the pupil receives educational grant guaranteed for low income
families; and (v) one of the parents is part of the travelling population. In order for a school
to be eligible for the EEO funding, it needs to satisfy two conditions: the first condition is that
the share of students with at least one of the five characteristics has to exceed an exogenously
set threshold; the second condition is that the school has to generate at least six teaching hours.
The exogenous cutoff is, for students in the first two years of secondary education (first stage
students), a minimum share of 10% disadvantaged students.
The Flemish Ministry of Education provided us with data on the universe of pupils in the first
stage of education in the school year 2010/2011 (135,682 students). In particular, we have data
on student level characteristics and school level characteristics. The student level characteristics
cover the gender of the pupil (gender), the grade retention in primary school (retention) and the
inclusion of the pupil in the special needs student population in primary school (which serves
as a proxy of student’s low cognitive skills). The school level characteristics include both the
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teacher characteristics, such as the teachers’ age, seniority and education, in addition to principal
characteristics, such as the principals’ age and seniority. Teacher and principal seniority measures
the level of experience of the teachers and principals, respectively. These variables assume values
in the range of 1 to 7, where the teachers (and principals) with a seniority level of 1 are the least
experienced (0-5 years of experience) and teachers (and principals) with a seniority level of 7 are
the most experienced (more than 30 years of experience)24. Similarly, the ages of teacher and
principal are reported as categorical variables that range from 1 to 8, where teachers/principals
in the first category are the youngest (less than 30 years old) and teachers/principals in the
last category are the oldest (more than 60 years old)25. Teachers’ education records whether
or not the teacher holds a pedagogical training (in the following we will refer to it as “teacher
training”). All these variables are aggregated at school level in the form of averages (for age and
seniority) and shares (for teachers’ education) and assigned to each student with respect to the
school where he/she is enrolled.
The outcome variables are two dummy variables defined as follows: the variable progress
school assumes value 1 if the student progresses to the following year without any grade retention
and 0 if not (this variable is a complement of school retention); the variable A-certificate assumes
value 1 if the student gets an “A-certificate” at the end of the school year (which is the most
favorable outcome) and 0 if not. Since we do not have data on standardized test scores for
Flemish students, A-certificate is a good, available proxy of student performance. Every year,
each student performs a final test and gets a ranking from “A” to “C”. Students that get an “A”
can progress school without any restriction, while the students that get either “B” or “C” can
progress school but only in specific programs or have some grade retention. Both these outcome
variables are proxies for different levels of students’ performance: a positive A-certificate proxies
for a higher level of performance than a positive progress school. In principle, the target of a
policy-maker could be to have the highest possible share of students getting “A-certificates” and
the lowest share of students not progressing through school.
24Teachers and principals’ seniority classes are the following: class 1: between 0 and 5 years of experience;
class 2: between 6 and 10; class 3: between 11 and 15; class 4: between 16 and 20; class 5: between 20 and 25;
class 6: between 26 and 30; class 7: more than 30.
25Teachers and principals’ age classes are the following: class 1: less than 30 years old; class 2: between 30
and 34; class 3: between 35 and 39; class 4: between 40 and 44; class 5: between 45 and 49; class 6: between 50
and 54; class 7: between 55 and 60; class 8: more than 60.
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4.2 Identification Strategy
To evaluate the impact of the policy on students’ performance we construct a fuzzy regression
discontinuity design (Hahn et al., 2001). Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) is a method
that aims at evaluating the causal effects of interventions in settings where the assignment to
the treatment is determined (at least partly) by the values of an observed covariate lying on
either sides of a threshold point. The idea is that subjects just above and below this threshold
are very similar and one can assume a quasi-randomization around the threshold (Mealli and
Rampichini, 2012). RDDs are categorized in sharp RDDs and fuzzy RDDs. In sharp RDDs,
the central assumption is that, around the threshold, there is a sharp discontinuity (from 0
to 1) in the probability of being treated. This is due to the fact that in sharp RDDs there
is no room for imperfect compliance. In the real world, however, thresholds are not strictly
implemented, as in the case of our application. To deal with these situations, one can use fuzzy
RDDs, which are applicable when around the threshold the probability of being actually treated
changes sharply, but not discontinuously from 0 to 1. In our application of the fuzzy RDD
technique, we exploit two cutoffs around the 10% share of disadvantaged students in the first
stage of secondary education. The students in schools just below the threshold are assigned to
the control group (Zi = 0), while the students in schools just above the threshold are assigned
to the treated group (Zi = 1). The bandwidth around the threshold (from which one obtains
the two cutoffs) is determined using the “rdrobust package” in R (Calonico et al., 2015). The
optimal, bias-corrected bandwidths around the threshold are 3.5% and 3.7%, respectively for the
outcome variables A-certificate and progress school. Accordingly to these two bandwidths, we
obtain two refined samples where the sample with the 3.5% bandwidth is the smallest and the
sample with the 3.7% bandwidth the largest. Moreover, to guarantee an equal representation to
all the schools, and to avoid biases related to the over-representation of biggest schools’ students,
we sample 50 pupils from each school. In turn, this leads to a higher balance among the averages
between the observations assigned to the treatment and the observations assigned to the control,
as shown in panel (a) of Figure 5. In Appendix C, we run a series of tests to show that the RDD
(Regression Discontinuity Design) is valid for this application. Moreover, as a robustness check
we sample a higher number of students according to the size of the smallest school (62 pupils)
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from every school. In Appendix D, we show the balance in the samples of units assigned to the
treatment and to the control in the second scenario.
4.3 Results
This Section assesses the effects of the additional funding on students’ performances and high-
lights the main drivers of the heterogeneity in causal effects. These analyses are made for both
the outcome variables: A-certificate and progress school26.
4.3.1 A-Certificate
Proceeding from the seminal contributions of Coleman (1966) and Hanushek (2003) to recent
contributions by Jackson et al. (2015) and Jackson (2018), the question on whether or not school
spending affects students’ performances has been central in the economic literature.
In our study, the variable A-certificate serves as a proxy for positive performance. In our
sample, the students that got an “A-certificate” are the 91.73% of the total population. In Figure
3, the heterogeneous Complier Average Causal Effects (CACE) estimated using the proposed
model are depicted2728. The darker the shade of blue in the node the higher the causal effect.
Although positive, the overall effect of the additional funding is not significant. This finding
is in line with the recent literature on school spending and students’ performance in a cross-
country scenario (Hanushek et al., 2016; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2017) and in the Flanders,
in particular (De Witte et al., 2017, 2018). Nevertheless, rather than focusing on the overall
average effect it is more interesting to explore the heterogeneous effects.
The first driver in the heterogeneity of the effects is the dummy variable primary retention:
for students who have experienced retention of grade during primary school, the effects of funding
are larger. These effects, even if not significant, show that the effect is slightly higher for students
that had a weaker performance in the past. The second driver of heterogeneity is the age of the
26It is important to highlight that the results for both the outcomes, considered separately, in terms of effects
and heterogeneity drivers, remain roughly the same when we widen the sample of units included in the analysis
(results are reported in the Appendix D).
27The nodes for whom (i) it was not possible to compute the CACE or, (ii) the weak-IV test was not rejected
were excluded from the plot.
28In Figures 3, 4, 8, 9, the so-called summarizing trees (Hahn et al., 2017) are depicted. A summarizing
tree is a classification or regression tree that is built using the fitted values estimated from the BCF-IV. These
summarizing trees are used to provide a visualization of the heterogeneity in the causal effects.
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teacher: students in schools with younger teachers (namely, when teaching age assumes values
lower or equal to 4 on a scale from 1 to 8, referring to teachers younger than 40 years old) have
a significant increase in their performance if they did not experience any retention in primary
school. This effect is positive and significant (although slightly lower: 0.06, meaning that being
treated leads to an increase of 6% in the probability of getting the best grade) even if we rule out
the conditioning on the students with no primary retention. This heterogeneity driver, namely,
the age of the teacher, is particularly appreciable as there are evidences in the education literature
that connect teachers’ age to their teaching performance (Young and Place, 1988; Kinney and
Smith, 1992) and in turn teaching performance to students’ positive achievements (Kosgei et al.,
2013). In the current scenario, it seems that the additional funding has a positive significant
effect when the additional teaching hours are granted to schools with younger teachers.
Further heterogeneous effects come from the interaction between teacher’s age and principal’s
seniority. The effect for students without primary retention in schools with younger teachers and
principals with lower levels of seniority (namely, lower or equal than 5 on a 1 to 7 scale, referring
to principals with less than 26 years of experience) is statistically significantly higher than the
effects on the overall population. Again, this holds true even if we rule out the conditioning on the
primary retention variable (the effect in this case is 0.18**, meaning that being treated leads to
an increase of 18% in the probability of getting the best grade). This sub-population of students
that accounts for the 32% and 34% of the overall sample (respectively, when conditioning, or
not, on the primary retention variable) shows effects that are between 3.2 and 3.5 times larger
than the overall effect29. This evidence can be interpreted in the following way: the additional
funding has a positive, but not statistically significant, effect in boosting the performance of
students in the overall population, but it increases its effect in a notable way for those students
in schools with younger teachers and less senior principals. These results, are in line with the
evidence that additional school funding does not boost the performance of the overall population
of students (Hanushek et al., 2016; Hanushek and Woessmann, 2017; De Witte et al., 2017, 2018)
293.2 is the ratio between the conditional treatment effect for the sub-population of students that did not
experience primary retention, and that are in schools with younger teachers and principals (0.1651), corresponding
to the bluer leaf in Figure 3, and the average treatment effect for the overall population (0.0511). 3.5 is the ratio
between the conditional treatment effect for the sub-population of students that are in schools with younger
teachers and principals (0.1769) and the average treatment effect on the overall population (0.0511).
25
and with the literature that connects students’ achievements with teaching performance (Young
and Place, 1988; Kinney and Smith, 1992) and, in turn, teaching performance with students’
performance (Kosgei et al., 2013). A novel evidence from the current research reveals that the
causal effects are lower when the principal have more than 25 years of seniority. This finding
opens up new fields for further investigation, in line with the newly established role of machine
learning in the economic literature as a “theory-driving/theory-testing” tool (Mullainathan and
Spiess, 2017).
These results are relevant to the policy as they furnish the instruments to policy-makers to
enhance the effects of additional funding on students’ performance. Indeed, on one side policy-
makers could target just students in school with positive, statistically significant effects reducing
the overall costs of the policy and using the savings to experiment more effective policies in
the other schools. On the other side, policy-makers could analyze the reason of lack of the
effectiveness of funding in schools with certain characteristics and implement policies to boost
the effects of future funding.
Figure 3: Visualization of the heterogeneous Complier Average Causal Effects (CACE) of additional funding
on A-certificate estimated using the proposed model. The tree is a summarizing classification tree fit to posterior
point estimates of individual treatment effects as in (Hahn et al., 2017). It is important to highlight that the
nodes for Teacher Age greater than four were trimmed from the tree (both when Primary Retention is equal to
0 and to 1) because the instrument in those nodes is weak. The significance level is * for a significance level of
0.05, ** for a significance level of 0.01 and *** for a significance level of 0.001.
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4.3.2 Progress in School
The second outcome variable, progress school, assumes value 1 if the student progresses to the
following year without any grade retention and 0 if not: roughly 98% of the students in the sample
manage to progress in school in the first two years of secondary education. For the students
unable to progress in school, this variable is used as a proxy of negative achievements. Therefore,
it is quite interesting to understand if additional funding were effective in driving students away
from negative performance. Figure 4 depicts the heterogeneous conditional CACEs: the darker
the shade of green in the node, the higher the causal effect.
The additional funding has a slightly positive impact on the chance of progress school for the
overall students in the sample30. This effect, as well as the heterogeneous causal effects are not
significant (again, this is in line with what was found by De Witte et al. (2018) at school level).
However, it is compelling to observe the main drivers of the heterogeneity in the causal effect.
The first driver is the gender of the student: the effect seems to be positive for male students
and negative for female students. This is particularly absorbing given the fact that 63% of the
students that do not progress in school are males. The second driver of the heterogeneity in
CACE is the principal seniority. As in the case of the previous outcome, students in schools
with more senior principals (more than 25 years of experience) show lower causal effects. This
holds true even when we do not condition on the gender of the students.
Furthermore, the added value of our algorithm is that it could enable policy-makers to target
just those units that benefit the most from the treatment and it provides an insight on possible
inefficiencies in the allocation and/or usage of funding. From our analysis it seems that there is
room for policies that support less senior principals since students in their schools show higher
returns in terms of performance from additional funding31.
30However, in the robustness checks this effect is slightly negative. In any case, also in the robustness checks
the overall effect is not statistically significant.
31It is worth highlighting that the heterogeneity drivers are slightly different for the two outcomes that we
observe. This could be due to the fact that A-certificate is a proxy of “positive” achievements, while progress
school is a proxy of “less positive” achievements. Hence, the subpopulations that are affected by the funding
are different for the two different outputs. Let us focus on positive treatment effects. On one hand, the funding
positively affect those students that would not be “A-students” in their absence. On the other hand, they
have a positive effect on those students that would not progress school in absence of the funding. These two
sub-populations are clearly different and in turn the heterogeneity drivers are different.
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Figure 4: Visualization of the heterogeneous Complier Average Causal Effects (CACE) of additional funding
on Progress School estimated using the proposed model. The tree is a summarizing classification tree fit to
posterior point estimates of individual treatment effects as in (Hahn et al., 2017). The significance level is * for
a significance level of 0.05, ** for a significance level of 0.01 and *** for a significance level of 0.001.
5 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper, we developed a novel Bayesian machine learning technique, BCF-IV, to draw
causal inference in scenarios with imperfect compliance. By investigating the heterogeneity in
the causal effects, the technique expedites targeted policies. We manifested that the BCF-IV
technique outperforms other machine learning techniques tailored for causal inference in precisely
estimating the causal effects and converges to an optimal asymptotic performance in identifying
the heterogeneity driving variables (HDVs). Moreover, we show that the competitive advantages
of using BCF-IV, as compared to GRF or HCT-IV, are substantial. Peculiarly, the performance
of BCF-IV in precisely estimating the heterogeneous causal effects shadows its slower convergence
to an optimal identification of HDVs as compared to GRF. This is especially true if we look at
the relative gaps between the BCF-IV and the other techniques.
BCF-IV can assist the researchers to shed light on the heterogeneity of causal effects in IV
scenarios in order to provide to policy-makers a relevant knowledge for targeted policies. In our
application, we evaluated the effects of additional funding on students’ performances. While the
overall effects are positive but not significant, there are significant differences among different
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sub-populations of students. Indeed, for students in schools with younger teachers and younger
principals (with respect to the average age and seniority, respectively) the effects of the policy
are between 3.2 and 3.5 times bigger than the effects on the overall population (in the most
conservative scenario) and significant for the A-certificate output.
On one hand, as an underlying mechanism, the need for additional funds can be higher in
schools with younger teachers and principals, who are more often observed in the most disad-
vantaged schools. This phenomenon arises as senior teachers and principals select themselves
out of the most disadvantaged schools and more into advantaged schools, thereby creating rel-
atively more vacancies in disadvantaged schools. Therefore, on average, younger teachers lack
a real choice but to start teaching in the most disadvantaged schools. Moreover, owing to the
additional funds, schools could use the funds to reduce class sizes, which might be more effective
for younger (and less senior) teachers. On the other hand, we can think of the motivation for
both teachers and principals to decrease as they grow older and this, in turn, have an impact
on their performance. Favouring this hypothesis Ololube (2006) finds that motivation enhances
productivity and has an impact on teachers’ performances. However, Arifin (2015) claims that
teachers’ motivation positively and significantly affects teacher’s job satisfaction, but it does
not affect their performance. The investigation of the true causal channel is beyond the goals
of this paper and is left to further investigation where more granular teachers’ and principals’
characteristics are available.
It is worth highlighting in this context that policy-makers could use the results from this
study to target just those students and schools that really benefit from the additional funding
in order to increase the welfare effects of the policy and to enhance targeted policies to boost
the effects of additional funding for those students that seem to avail lesser benefits.
The extension of these methods to other fields of economic investigation and the development
of novel machine learning algorithms for targeted policies and welfare maximization can form
the future scope of further research. In particular, the development of an algorithm that could
deal with welfare maximization in the context of multiple outcomes is of interest. Moreover,
further research should focus on connecting BCF-IV and GRF into a single ensemble algorithm,
following (Van der Laan et al., 2007), to obtain a novel algorithm that combines the small
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and large sample properties of both BCF-IV and GRF to obtain possible gains in imperfect
compliance scenarios.
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A Discussion on the Instrumental Variables Assumptions
In a typical IV scenario one can express the treatment received as a function of the treatment
assigned: Wi(Zi). This leads to distinguish four sub-populations of units (Gi) (Angrist et al.,
1996; Imbens and Rubin, 2015): (i) those that comply with the assignment (compliers : Gi = C :
Wi(Zi = 0) = 0 and Wi(Zi = 1) = 1); (ii) those that never comply with the assignment (defiers :
Gi = D : Wi(Zi = 0) = 1 and Wi(Zi = 1) = 0); (iii) those that even if not assigned to the
treatment always take it (always-takers : Gi = AT : Wi(Zi = 0) = 1,Wi(Zi = 1) = 1); (iv) those
that even if assigned to the treatment never take it (never-takers : Gi = NT : Wi(Zi = 0) =
0,Wi(Zi = 1) = 0). In such a scenario what “one directly gets from the data” is the so-called
Intention-To-Treat (ITTY ):
ITTY = E[Yi|Zi = 1]− E[Yi|Zi = 0], (25)
which is defined as the effect of the intention to treat a unit on the outcome of the same unit.
(25) can be written as the weighted average of the intention-to-treat effects across the four
sub-populations of compliers, defiers, always-takers and never-takers:
ITTY = piCITTY,C + piDITTY,D + piNT ITTY,NT + piAT ITTY,AT , (26)
where ITTY,G is the effect of the treatment assignment on units of typeG and piG is the proportion
of units of type G.
ITTY does not represent the effect of the treatment itself but just the effect of the assignment
to the treatment. If we want to draw proper causal inference in such a scenario we need to invoke
the four classical IV assumptions (Angrist et al., 1996):
1. exclusion restriction: Yi(0) = Yi(1), for Gi ∈ {AT,NT} where, for each sub-population
and z ∈ {0, 1}, the shortened notation Yi(z) is used to denote Yi(z,Wi(z))
2. monotonicity : Wi(1) ≥ Wi(0)→ piD = 0;
3. existence of compliers : P (Wi(0) < Wi(1)) > 0→ piC 6= 0;
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4. unconfoundedness of the instrument :
Zi ⊥ (Yi(0, 0), Yi(0, 1), Yi(1, 0), Yi(1, 1),Wi(0),Wi(1)).
In our application, these four assumptions are assumed to hold. Let us look at them in
detail. The exclusion restriction is assumed to hold since we can reasonably rule out a direct
effect of being eligible (around the threshold) on the performance of students. The effect, in
this case, can be reasonably assumed to go through the actual reception of additional funding.
Monotonicity holds by design: since we are in a one-sided non-compliance scenario there is no
possibility for those who are not assigned to the treatment to defy and get the treatment. The
same can be said about the existence of compliers. Since the sub-population of always-takers can
be ruled out by design, this leads to the fact that units receiving the treatment are compliers.
Unconfoundedness of the instrument can also reasonably be assumed to hold since observations
around the exogenous threshold are as good as if they were randomized to the assigned-to-the-
treatment group and the assigned-to-the control group. This holds true especially since we do
not observe any manipulation around the threshold and sorting of the units into the treated
group.
B Robustness Checks in Monte Carlo Simulations
We introduce some changes in the synthetic models used to test the fit of the BCF-IV (as
compared to GRF and HCT-IV). The model from which we start is the simplest model introduced
in Section 3: Yi =
∑k
p=1Xi,p + Wi · Xi,1 + ξi + i where Xi,p ∼ N (0, 1),Wi ∼ Bern(0.5), ξi ∼
N (0, 0.01), i ∼ N (0, 1) and k = 5. We introduce 5 different variations in this model (each one
corresponds to a different design in Table 5):
1. we change the correlation between Zi andWi in order to introduce possible weak-instrument
problems: we decrease the correlation to Cor(Wi, Zi) ∈ (0.45, 0.55) and we do so by intro-
ducing in half of the population a very weak instrument Cor(Wi, Zi|Xi,5 < 0) ∈ (0.35, 0.45);
2. we introduce a partial violation in the exclusion restriction;
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3. we introduce multiple heterogeneity driving variables (HDVs):
Yi =
k∑
p=1
Xi,p +
2∑
p=1
(Wi ·Xi,p) + ξi + i, (27)
where this variation is introduced to test if the HDVs are correctly selected even when
they are multiple;
4. we change the error distribution, i ∼ U(0, 1), to test if the algorithm is robust to changes
in the noise parameter;
5. we manipulate the propensity score function for the BCF-IV, to test if this model is robust
to a mis-specification of pˆi(x).
The results from these five different designs are reported in 1. In the presence of a weak-
instrument (design 1), the fit of all the three algorithms deteriorates. As we saw in the Monte
Carlo simulations in Section 3, GRF is better in identifying the correct HDV but BCF-IV
outperforms both GRF and HCT-IV in picking the right threshold and in precisely estimating
the causal effect. As we introduce a partial violation of the exclusion restriction (design 2),
BCF-IV outperforms the other algorithms with respect to all the dimensions both in the cases
with small sample and large sample sizes. When we introduce multiple heterogeneity driving
variables, the capacity of correctly estimating the causal effects for GRF deteriorates while BCF-
IV outperforms the other algorithms. In the last two designs (design 4 and 5), we again see a
trade-off, for the designs with 500 and 1,000 units, between the capacity of correctly identifying
the HDV (GRF outperforms the other techniques) and precisely estimating the causal effects
(BCF-IV outperforms the other algorithms). In both the latter designs, BCF-IV and GRF get
to fairly similar asymptotic results.
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Table 1: Robustness Checks
Sample Size
#Design Approach 500 1000 5000 500 1000 5000 500 1000 5000
HDV Threshold MSE given HDV
1 BCF-IV 0.37 0.63 0.83 0.065 0.031 0.007 0.078 0.117 0.017
GRF 0.56 0.73 1.00 0.157 0.107 0.007 0.230 0.122 0.011
HTC-IV 0.23 0.36 0.73 0.289 0.090 0.065 0.110 0.140 0.022
2 BCF-IV 0.63 0.40 0.77 0.022 0.061 0.002 0.005 0.107 0.043
GRF 0.43 0.57 0.23 0.052 0.067 0.003 0.171 0.082 0.035
HTC-IV 0.43 0.37 0.53 0.189 0.170 0.064 0.018 0.102 0.056
3 BCF-IV 0.60 0.76 1.00 0.352 0.242 0.021 0.183 0.077 0.004
GRF 0.77 1.00 1.00 0.169 0.230 0.004 0.776 0.365 0.275
HTC-IV 0.53 0.63 0.73 0.323 0.289 0.180 0.312 0.116 0.031
4 BCF-IV 0.63 0.80 1.00 0.043 0.065 0.002 0.006 0.009 0.002
GRF 0.80 0.97 1.00 0.068 0.014 0.001 0.211 0.031 0.001
HTC-IV 0.47 0.40 0.70 0.207 0.103 0.087 0.029 0.014 0.017
5 BCF-IV 0.53 0.63 1.00 0.112 0.020 0.016 0.018 0.011 0.007
GRF 0.63 0.83 1.00 0.062 0.069 0.002 0.330 0.030 0.001
HTC-IV 0.43 0.40 0.70 0.185 0.188 0.045 0.067 0.051 0.012
Table 1: Results from the robustness checks. HDV refers to the proportion of correctly identified Heterogene-
ity Driving Variables (HDV); Threshold refers to the mean-squared-error between the true threshold and the
predicted one; MSE given HDV refers to the mean-squared-error of prediction for the true causal effects. We
highlighted in bold the best results for every round of simulations.
C RDD Checks
In order to check whether or not the RDD (Regression Discontinuity Design) setting is valid, we
implement the following checks (Lee and Lemieux, 2010)32: (i) we check the balance in the sample
32The checks depicted in this Subsection are made on the sample of 50 students introduced in Subsection 4.2.
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of units assigned to the treatment just above and below the threshold (this is done to check if the
randomization holds); (ii) we examine if there are manipulations in the distribution of schools
with respect to the share of disadvantaged students around the threshold, (iii) we employ a formal
manipulation test, the McCrary test (McCrary, 2008), to discover potential sorting around the
threshold; (iv) we check if there is a discontinuity in the probability of being assigned to the
treatment around the threshold. Table 2 shows that the averages of the control variables are
not statistically different for the group of units assigned to the treatment and assigned to the
control around the cutoff, with the exception of teacher seniority. Thus, there is evidence that
more senior teachers self-select in schools with lower disadvantaged students. However, as we
will show in Section 4.3, this variable does not surface in any model as a heterogeneity driver.
We argue that including this variable in our model results in more robust findings. This is due
to the fact that our model is robust to spurious heterogeneity coming from unbalances in the
samples, as shown by Hahn et al. (2017) in randomized and regular assignment mechanisms’
scenarios. Moreover, panel (b) of Figure 5 shows the standardized difference in the means for
these two groups with the relative standardized confidence intervals. The McCrary manipulation
test implemented in Calonico et al. (2015) through a Local-Polynomial Density Estimation leads
to the rejection of the null hypothesis of the threshold manipulation33. Both these results and
the plot of the distribution of schools with respect to the share of disadvantaged students around
the threshold in Figure 6 indicate that there is no evidence of manipulation. Finally, Figure 7
shows a clear discontinuity in the probability of being assigned to the treatment around the
threshold.
However, as we pointed out in Section 4, schools that are assigned to the treatment actually
receive the treatment if they satisfy an additional condition of a minimum of six teaching hours.
This leads to a fuzzy-regression discontinuity design where the jump in the probability of being
assigned to the treatment around the cutoff is not sharp. This scenario is characterized by
imperfect compliance.
Students can be sorted, with respect to their compliance status, into two types: (i) students
in schools above the cutoff with more than six teaching hours or students in schools below the
33The McCrary test leads to a T-value of -0.7497 corresponding to a p-value of 0.4534. The test is performed
aggregating the student data at school level.
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cutoff (compliers : Wi(Zi = 1) = 1 or Wi(Zi = 0) = 0); (ii) students in schools above the cutoff
but with less than six teaching hours (never-takers : Wi(Zi = 1) = 0)
34.
The assignment to the treatment variable (i.e., studying in a school just below or above the
cutoff) is a relevant instrumental variable in our scenario (namely, the correlation between Zi
and Wi is roughly 0.62). Moreover, we can reasonably assume both the exogeneity condition
and the exclusion restriction to hold in this situation. On one side, since the randomization of
the instrument holds there is no reason not to assume conditional independence between the
instrument and the unobservables. On the other side, the exclusion restriction seems to hold
as well since we can believe that being just below or above the threshold does not affect the
performance of students in any way other than through the additional funding. In this imperfect
compliance setting, the causal effect of the additional funding on the students’ performance can
be assessed through the Complier Average Causal Effect in (5). Moreover, using our novel BCF-
IV algorithm we can estimate the Conditional Complier Average Causal Effect, (6), to assess
the heterogeneity in the causal effects.
a: Balance improvement obtained with sampling.
“Initial” refers to the initial sample, while “Sam-
pled” refers to the bootstrapped sample.
b: Standardized difference in means (SDM) and
95% confidence interval around the cutoff with a
bandwidth of 3.5%.
Figure 5: The label “PS” refers to Principal Seniority, the label “PA” to Principal Age, the label “TS” to
Teacher Seniority, the label “TA” to Teacher Age, the label “TT” to Teacher Training and the label “BULO”
refers to students with special needs in primary education.
34This a so-called case of one-sided-non-compliance, in which we do not observe any always-takers since for
those that are sorted out of the assignment to the treatment (Zi = 0) there is no possibility to access the
treatment.
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Figure 6: Frequency distribution of disadvantaged students around the threshold (10%). In red the density of
the disadvantaged students in the units assigned to the treatment and in blue the density for the units assigned
to the control. The densities are aggregated at school level.
Above Cutoff Below Cutoff Full Sample p-value
Retention 0.036 (0.187) 0.037 (0.189) 0.037 (0.188) 0.913
Gender 0.492 (0.500) 0.471 (0.499) 0.482 (0.500) 0.155
Special Needs 0.000 (0.000) 0.002 (0.044) 0.001 (0.030) 0.045
Teacher Age 4.022 (0.333) 4.024 (0.269) 4.023 (0.304) 0.814
Teacher Seniority 3.867 (0.452) 3.927 (0.342) 3.895 (0.404) 0.000
Teacher Training 0.982 (0.025) 0.981 (0.026) 0.982 (0.026) 0.169
Principal Age 6.022 (1.308) 5.951 (1.229) 5.988 (1.271) 0.067
Principal Seniority 5.778 (1.228) 5.829 (0.935) 5.802 (1.098) 0.120
Observations 2250 2050 4300
Table 2: Results for 3.5% discontinuity sample with bootstrapped samples of size 50. Standard deviations are
in parentheses and the p-value corresponds to a t-test for the difference between the means in the group above
and below the threshold.
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Figure 7: Probability of treatment given the share of disadvantaged students (EEO percentage) in the first
stage of secondary education (cutoff 10%).
D Robustness Checks for Policy Evaluation
In this Section of the Appendix, we test the robustness of our models to sampling variations. The
sampling variations introduced are of two sources: (i) a wider bandwidth around the threshold
(from 3.5% to 3.7%) and (ii) an expansion in the number of sampled units (from 50 up to
the lowest number of students per school which is 62). To understand if the balance and the
results are robust we manifest the balance in the averages in the samples of units assigned to
the treatment and assigned to the control (Tables 3, 4, 5) and the results of the causal effects
when we increase the number of units sampled (Figures 8, 9).
In all the different samples the school level characteristics remain widely balanced (with the
exception of teacher seniority35). Primary retention and Gender seem to be slightly unbalanced
when we widen the bandwidth, this however holds true just in the case where we sample through
bootstrap 50 units (Gender in this case gets back to a good balance).
35This could be due to the fact that less senior principals select themselves in schools with a lower percentage
of disadvantaged students.
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Above Cutoff Below Cutoff Full Sample p-value
Gender 0.471 (0.499) 0.493 (0.500) 0.482 (0.499) 0.110
Retention 0.039 (0.194) 0.035 (0.184) 0.037 (0.189) 0.418
Special Needs 0.001 (0.039) 0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.027) 0.045
Teacher Age 4.024 (0.269) 4.002 (0.333) 4.023 (0.304) 0.793
Teacher Seniority 3.926 (0.341) 3.867 (0.452) 3.895 (0.404) 0.000
Teacher Training 0.982 (0.025) 0.981 (0.026) 0.982 (0.026) 0.126
Principal Age 5.951 (1.228) 6.002 (1.308) 5.988 (1.271) 0.041
Principal Seniority 5.829 (0.934) 5.777 (1.227) 5.802 (1.097) 0.083
Observations 2790 2542 5332
Table 3: Results for 3.5% discontinuity sample with bootstrapped samples of size 62. Standard deviations are
in parentheses and the p-value corresponds to a t-test for the difference between the means in the group above
and below the threshold.
Above Cutoff Below Cutoff Full Sample p-value
Retention 0.030 (0.170) 0.042 (0.201) 0.036 (0.186) 0.025
Gender 0.497 (0.500) 0.461 (0.499) 0.479 (0.500) 0.015
Special Needs 0.000 (0.021) 0.001 (0.037) 0.001 (0.030) 0.309
Teacher Age 4.022 (0.333) 4.023 (0.260) 4.022 (0.299) 0.955
Teacher Seniority 3.867 (0.452) 3.932 (0.330) 3.899 (0.398) 0.000
Teacher Training 0.982 (0.025) 0.983 (0.026) 0.983 (0.026) 0.805
Principal Age 6.022 (1.308) 6.000 (1.206) 6.011 (1.259) 0.556
Principal Seniority 5.778 (1.228) 5.818 (0.912) 5.798 (1.083) 0.212
Observations 2250 2200 4450
Table 4: Results for 3.7% discontinuity sample with bootstrapped samples of size 50. Standard deviations are
in parentheses and the p-value corresponds to a t-test for the difference between the means in the group above
and below the threshold.
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Above Cutoff Below Cutoff Full Sample p-value
Retention 0.029 (0.168) 0.040 (0.196) 0.034 (0.182) 0.026
Gender 0.490 (0.500) 0.464 (0.499) 0.477 (0.500) 0.058
Special Needs 0.000 (0.019) 0.001 (0.038) 0.001 (0.030) 0.174
Teacher Age 4.022 (0.333) 4.023 (0.260) 4.022 (0.299) 0.950
Teacher Seniority 3.867 (0.452) 3.932 (0.330) 3.899 (0.398) 0.000
Teacher Training 0.982 (0.025) 0.983 (0.026) 0.983 (0.026) 0.784
Principal Age 6.022 (1.308) 6.000 (1.206) 6.011 (1.259) 0.512
Principal Seniority 5.778 (1.227) 5.818 (0.912) 5.798 (1.083) 0.165
Observations 2790 2728 5518
Table 5: Results for 3.7% discontinuity sample with bootstrapped samples of size 62 (the smallest school in
the sample). Standard deviations are in parentheses and the p-value corresponds to a t-test for the difference
between the means in the group above and below the threshold.
With respect to the results of the BCF-IV algorithm when we increase the number of sampled
units they remain widely the same. There are two slight differences: (i) in the case of the
summarizing tree for A-certificate, in Figure 8, for units with Primary retention equal to one the
effect is now negative but still not significant (it is important to notice that these observations
account just for the 4% of the overall units); (ii) in the case of the summarizing tree for Progress
School the overall effect is now negative but still not significant. An important observation is
that there are no differences in the heterogeneity drivers and in the direction of the effects (i.e.,
for more senior principals the effects for both the outcomes are still lower).
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Figure 8: Visualization of the heterogeneous Complier Average Causal Effects (CACE) of additional funding
on A-certificate estimated using the proposed model. The tree is a summarizing classification tree fit to posterior
point estimates of individual treatment effects as in Hahn et al. (2017). The significance level is * for a significance
level of 0.05, ** for a significance level of 0.01 and *** for a significance level of 0.001.
Figure 9: Visualization of the heterogeneous Complier Average Causal Effects (CACE) of additional funding
on Progress School estimated using the proposed model. The tree is a summarizing classification tree fit to
posterior point estimates of individual treatment effects as in Hahn et al. (2017). The significance level is * for
a significance level of 0.05, ** for a significance level of 0.01 and *** for a significance level of 0.001.
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